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ABSTRACT
Turkish political system, experiencing a process of 
change after World War I, has been deeply influenced by 
the metamorphosis of the political elite and of the all 
other political actors. The fact that the metamorphosis 
is not an ongoing linear process, the breaks that Turkish 
democracy faced are also the milestones of this change. 
1980 military intervention, defining its raison d'etre 
as the lack of reconciliation among the politicians, 
initiated a new phase in Turkish political system. In 
this context, and in the context of Turkic republics 
proclaiming their independence one after another, Pan- 
Turkism and New-Ottomanism being discussed again, and 
ethnic questions coming to the agenda in Turkey and in 
the world, this study endeavors to investigate if and to 
what extent some of the political elite in the True Path 
Party are subscribed to ethnic rather than territorial 
nationalism, the latter being the nationalism conception 
of the Republic of Turkey from its very beginning.
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION
1.1) Nationalism
No force has greater influence upon world affairs than
nationalism nor is any other so responsible for political action
and reaction. The association with one's own nation and the
recognition of states other than one's own are fundamental to
1
modern political organization.
A nation is a large group of people with or without
government, with or without country who believe that they belong
together because of certain characteristics that separate them 
2
from others. Nationalism, on the other hand, is a state of
mind in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be
3
owed to the nation. In other words, nationalism means
asserting the primacy of a group affinity based on a language,
culture and descent, and sometimes on a common religion and
4
territory as well, over all other claims on a person's loyalty.
As a political doctrine it claims to provide the ideological
basis and justification for the right of all the world's people
5
to organize themselves into independent or autonomous entities.
Nationalism 'is the exaggerated and unjustified tendency to 
emphasize national interests. Critics condemn it as an outmoded,
1
deep-seated disease because its generative element is described
as egoistic: all those living in a given country belong to one
and the same in-group, which is distinct from the out-groups
surrounding it. Functioning in a milieu of historical paradox,
nationalism is notorious for producing strange myths, which
come to be accepted as normal and rational. In these critics can
be found the fear of the potential force of nationalism for
unity, disruption, independence, fraternity, colonial
expansion, aggression, anticolonialism, economic expansion,
6
in short, undesired change.
1.2) Ethnic and Territorial Dimensions of Nationalism.
1.2.1) Ethnic Nationalism
Nations seek explanation for their character in the past, 
real or imagined. Frequently, the tie of language is 
overwhelming, although not always. Germany and Austria are
separate countries regardless of their common language, and 
Switzerland is a multilingual state. Nevertheless, the force of 
language should not be underestimated. Religion, similarly, 
often plays a key role, but not always. The Nazis invoked race 
as a characteristic of nationalism. Their emphasis was extreme, 
but ethnic identity frequently does affect nationalistic 
sentiment. However strong other characteristics may be, a 
perception of a common history and a cultural tradition deriving 
from it is almost always be an essential element of nationalism.
2
Cultural nationalism providing the explanation for the 
character of a nation, is the allegiance of people to the factors 
which shape their culture, language, religion and a common 
history.
Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, is an ideological
■ovement on behalf of the autonomy, unity and identity of a
human population conceived by some of its members as an actual or
potential nation which in turn is defined in terms of a myth
7
of ancestry and historic culture. It refers to sentiments of 
belonging and aspirations for the well-being and autonomy of 
human populations conceived as nations in terms of common 
cultural traits and historical experiences. In its incidence and 
political impact, the ethnic variety of nationalism is 
undoubtedly the most important, given the large number of 
polyethnic states and the appeal of ascriptive ties and historic 
cultures.
Explanations of ethnic nationalism fall into two main
groups. The so-called 'primordialists' tend to see ethnicity as
a given of the human condition and hence the striving for ethno-
national autonomy as universal, if not natural. The so-called
'instrumentalists' regard ethnic communities and nations as weak
constructs and ethnic perception and national sentiment as
situational, the boundaries of belonging and opposition vary
with the situation of the perceiver, thus they are
7
manipulable. According to them, ethnic culture is an instrument
3
for mobilizing group emotion on behalf of causes used by elites 
in their competition for wealth and power.
1.2.2) Territorial Nationalism
Nationalism is argued by Yehoshua Arieli as follows:
"Nationalism rises beyond loyalties to ancient traditions or the
attachment of men to their land, their homes and the localities
to which they belong". The territorial dimension of nationalism
is, by itself, one of the major effects that shape contemporary 
8
national ism.
Some sharing of space is implicit in any group's occupation
or control of a particular piece of territory. Individual
membership of the group will be based on a shared identity, or
understanding of entitlement to some of what is produced or
9
appropriated collectively. Particular rivers, mountains and
the like can take on deep, even mystical or religious
significance in expressing what might have been the harrowing
historical experience of surviving the struggle with nature or
10
some hostile competitors for territory.
Territoriality is not some innate human trait but a social 
construct. It can take different forms in different geographical 
and historical circumstances. It is not sufficient to see 
territoriality simply as normal and a necessary characteristic of 
human existence. However, according to one view, man, like the 
lower animals, is moved instinctively and unconsciously to defend
4
his own living space. This thesis suggests that when human beings
form social groups to defend their title to the land or the
sovereignty of their country, they are acting no differently
and no less innately from similar motivations in the lower
animal world. Thus, nation-state is merely an invention of man to
1 1
indicate the territory of the in-group. Territoriality and its 
various expressions must be recognized as means to some end, 
such as, survival, political control or xenopnobia.
Territoriality is then, the attempt by an individual or a
group to affect, influence or control people, phenomena and
relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a
12
geographical area. When this area is called "country", the 
same attempt is called territorial nationalism.
This nationalism reinforces and reproduces the collective
sense of identity of its citizens, an identity that attempts to
13
transcend alternative allegiances and it can also lead
14
to the notion of common economic interest.
1.2.3) Ethno-Territorial Nationalism
It is probably correct to say that while in the West 
territorial and ethnic nationalism were combined, as during the 
French Revolution, in eastern Europe , the Middle East and 
south Asia, ethnic nationalism has tended to overshadow pure 
territorial nationalism operating on behalf of units based on
5
historic or colonial territories. Even in these areas, however,
territorial nationalism has sometimes been espoused by sections
15
of intelligentsia and the bureaucracy to grapple with the 
ideological aspirations and movements of host ethnic communities 
within the new states.
On the other hand, ethnic groups seek to have a geographical 
space. For the vindication of the ethnic group it is not always 
sufficient that a social border be drawn between itself and 
similar groups. The desire to live together necessitates some
limited territory which is very likely to be the country of the 
group.
The Kulturnation nationalism of German scholars reflects a 
common heritage of language, tradition, religion, descent 
(hence race) and world view. Being very close to ethnic
nationalism, it is the opposite of the Staatnation nationalism, 
in which, the reason for unification is based solely upon 
expedience or logical schemes, is purely political, but not the 
result of historical evolution. These definitions being 
ideal types, it is not easy to find a genuine example of
nationalism that fits exactly to any one of them. Turkish 
nationalism is no exception.
t
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1.3) Elite Imposition of Nationalism
Turkish nationalism emerged much later than other 
nationalisms, and it has been imposed from above, by the elites. 
The decline of the Ottoman Empire obligated Turkish political 
elite to take stock of themselves and the system. They blamed 
Ottomanist policies of the end of the Empire and decided that 
the only way out was Turkish nationalism. The Party for Union and 
Progress changed these thoughts to the Turkism ideal which failed 
catastrophically resulting in the collapse of the Empire. This 
stage was the stage of cultural nationalism. The founders of 
Turkish Republic, in consensus on the necessity of a 
nationalism, created a different one by sharing the cultural 
part of the first, by adding it modernization, but by rejecting 
the Turkism ideal. Their nationalism was territorial.
Today, the political elite of Turkey is worth studying 
concerning their nationalistic attitude. The political elite 
being a large group, and nationalism generally being found at the 
right of the spectrum, the True Path Party (TPP), the leading 
right party, as well as the major partner of the coalition 
government since October 1991 is the best unit of analysis for 
this study. The TPP, then selected for the analysis, is also the 
party which defined itself to be the continuation of the 
Democratic Party, the mother party of Turkish right.
7
1.4) Historical Background
To understand the development of Turkish nationalism, it 
would be better to begin with the question that Turkish 
nationalists ask themselves very frequently: Why did Ottoman
Empire decline from being the giant of its time to "the sick man 
of Europe"? Religion was the same religion; traditions were to 
some extent changed because of the decline; race was the least 
effective factor; and minorities have always had their rights.
Turkish nationalism was a reaction to the decline of the
Empire. Before the nationalist and separatist actions of the
16
minorities, Turks opted for Ottomanism. The Ottoman spirit was 
so internalized by the Turks that, Mithat Pasha had thought about 
placing a cross near the moon and the star on the flag. At the 
end of 19th century Turks blamed the system being against 
them and serving all the groups in the Empire, but the Turks. 
First the elite and then the young military officers began to 
emphasize "Turkish nation", adopting the epiteth "Young Turks" 
given to them by the West. Ziya Gokalp, being the godfather of 
Turkish nationalist thinkers, saw the elite-mass conflict of 
centuries as the major problem and argued that a common 
national culture and national consciousness should be created.
The Balkan Wars, 1912, were the real beginning of Turkish 
nationalism even though the Union and Progress was in government
8
since the adoption of the Second Constitution, 1908. Türk Yurdu
Dergisi, a publication of Turkish Hearths, was, in the early 
decades of the twentieth century, the journal of well-known 
intellectuals such as Ziya Gökalp, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Yusuf Akçura, 
Fuat Köprülü, and Mehmet Emin Yurdakul. Following Ahmed Vefik 
Pasha, Ali Suavi, Şinasi, and İsmail Gaspıralı, they stressed 
the importance of language as a factor of national unity. Their 
ideologist was Ziya Gökalp who was for national religion and 
cultural nationalism. He criticized the Sharia or Religious Laws 
and the Islamic dogma which were, for him, the reasons for the 
decline of the empire. Fuat Köprülü came out with a new 
perspective of history which was a way of rewriting it for the 
Turks.
These theses were deeply internalized by the Young Turk 
government; Turkism became the official ideology of the state 
and led to the entrance of the Empire to the World War I which 
brought its demise.
During the National War of Independence, Berthe George-
Gaulis wrote that "the most observable characteristic of Turkish
nationalism is an absolute self-sacrifice by forgetting its own 
17
existence". This war being called national, was not initiated 
against the Empire. The nationalism emphasis of this war was 
witnessed at the end of it.
9
The founders of Turkish Republic, meaning the winners of
the war, adopted the mission of reproducing the society. Their
major aim was to catch up with the contemporary civilization.
For them nationalism was needed as a tool or as a glue to unify
the society as well as the land. Misak-i Milli (the "National 
18
Oath") borders were defined territory of the new state; in 
these borders a new nation would rise. These idealistic aims 
needed some myths or legends to be realized, and they created 
them.
The Sun Language Theory, which is one of the most 
interesting theories for the birth of languages if not the most 
surprising, argued that Turkish was the first language in the 
world, and all other languages were derived from it. Leaving 
aside some serious exaggerations, it is questionable if this 
theory was strictly necessary for the language reform. The 
Ottoman which was "infected" by Arabic and Persian, was the 
major separator between the elite and the masses, if not the only 
one. To "cleanse" Turkish from these "alien" factors and to 
purify it, Turkish Language Association was established. The 
Latin alphabet was another means to modernize the language and to 
break up the language tie with the Ottoman culture. In 
addition to all these reforms and with the effect of the rising 
nationalist-fascist regimes in Europe, the call to prayer was 
translated into Turkish. This was a period during which Turanism 
was reincarnated.
10
A nation without a common history, according to the
founders of the Republic, was not a nation. This was very
understandable because earlier Turks were not recognized as a
privileged nation; they were lacking in self-respect. The
history was reviewed by the Turkish History Association with the
thesis of the immigration of nations. According to this thesis,
Turks immigrated from Central Asia as well as the Indians of
North America and the Jews of the Eastern Europe. They are the
founders of large states and empires, and their history is full
of courage and piety, along with culture and science. It was
also argued that the pre-Ottoman glories of the Turk is in
Central Asia or on the civilization of the Anatolian Hittites who
were claimed to be Turks like many other groups in and around 
19
Anatolia. Even though these claims were not accepted by
conservative nationalists, they served as tools to break up the
historical tie with the Ottoman past. The conservative
nationalists, on the other hand, were for a smoother break from
the past. The winds of the nostalgic nationalism of Europe
20
carried "Turan" back to the agenda in 1940s. Necip Fazıl
Kısakürek and Zeki Velidi Togan were the leading proponents of
this approach; they aimed "to save the Turks who were under the 
pressure of communism" in the then Soviet Union. Also, according 
to them Islam had not to be rejected in the definition of 
nationalism . These conservatism, Turanism, anti-communism and 
pro-Islam principles are still alive in Turkish politics. The 
Nationalist Action Party before 1980 and its successor
11
the Nationalist Work Party, are the inheritors of these 
principles.
Secularism was by itself the major reform of the Turkish 
Republic, but it also had a significant impact on the 
nationalism conception. Ottomanism of the late 19th century and 
the Pan-Islamism of Abdülhamid II (1876-1909) ( two extreme 
policies on religion - one is for all "religions of the book", 
the other for only Islam) were dramatically replaced by 
secularism. This was the major change in Turkish cultural 
identity, and another break up of the new state from its cultural 
inheritance.
The nationalism of the founders of the Republic, however, 
was not only a cultural nationalism. As agreed in the Lausanne 
Conference (July 24th 1920), Turkish borders were the borders of 
the new state. Pan-Turkism was out of question. The concept 
of nationalism was changed to that of encouraging the people of 
this new state to develop within its own borders. The 
charismatic leader of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, said, "Happy is he who calls himself a Turk". 
Also, one of the most characteristic aspects of Republican 
People's Party (RPP) nationalism was its non-expansionism. In 
Atatürk's words, "Peace in the country, peace in the world", 
was the principle of Turkish foreign policy. Misak-ı Milli 
borders were the borders of Turkish nationalism.
12 —
There is no ethnic characteristic in the "official" 
conception of nationalism. The nationalism of the founders of 
the Republic was presented as cultural nationalism, but it was 
territorial rather than cultural.
1.5) The Present Study
Today, with the destruction of many Marxist regimes and the 
rise of human rights in the world, the ethnic questions are on 
the agenda. European experiments have shown us that there would 
be problems in cohabitation. The ethnic and regional 
cleavages are in the agenda of Turkey, too. For the first 
time in the country's history a regional party, the People's Work 
Party, representing the South-East Anatolia has a group in the 
parliament. The members of this party claim that they are the 
representatives of the Kurds who were ignored, if not 
exploited, by the Turks. They argue that the cultural needs of 
the Kurds and the economic development of the region were 
neglected. Also a separatist organization, Worker's Party of 
Kurdistan (PKK), is fighting against the state powers for 
carving a territory for the Kurds. These problems are discussed 
on various platforms in Turkey.
The present study aims to investigate if and to what extent 
the political elite of the leading party in Turkey of the early 
1990s subscribe to ethnic rather than territorial 
national ism.
13
Chapter two looks at the political and social power of the 
political elite in Turkey from the Ottoman times to the present. 
The reforms that the political elites imposed on society, 
the reactions of the masses to those reforms, and the effects of 
this interaction on Turkish political life are discussed in 
Chapter two. In Chapter three, a brief history of Turkish 
nationalism and an overview of its development are presented. The 
origins of Turkish nationalism, ideologies behind different 
categories of nationalism, their ideologues and people's 
reactions to different views on nationalism are taken up. 
Chapter four discusses the political movement which created the 
TPP, and the nationalism conception behind this movement. 
Then an analysis of the TPP nationalism is made, viewing its 
territorial and ethnic dimensions. In the last part of the 
chapter , the TPP's approach towards the South East Problem of 
Turkey is discussed. The concluding chapter summarizes the basic 
points made in this study and offers some conjectures on the 
future of Turkish nationalism.
The selection of the political elites studied is based on 
several factors. First of all, the person to be studied should be 
a prominent member of the party. Second factor is the 
frequency of his public statements on the present subject matter 
(nationalism). Thirdly, this person should have a specific and 
well-defined conceptualization of nationalism. With these 
limitations, I chose 6 political elites in the TPP. Süleyman 
Demirel ( the Prime Minister and the head of the party) ,
14
Hüsamettin Cindoruk ( the Speaker of the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly), İsmet Sezgin( the Minister of Internal Affairs) , 
Coşkun Kırca ( retired ambassador and writer on foreign 
affairs), Bedrettin Dalan ( the former head of the 
Democratic Center Party which later joined the TPP ), and 
Ayvaz Gökdemir ( one of the leaders of the conservative group 
within the party).
Also for the period covering three months before and after 
the elections of 21 October 1991, Tercüman (an Istanbul daily) 
was studied. Tercüman is a rightist newspaper and, calls itself 
"the newspaper of the common sense"; the Turkish translation of 
common sense also means the sense of the right.
15
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Chapter Two
POLITICAL ELITE IN TURKISH POLITICAL LIFE
One of the central problems of Turkish politics is and long
has been the problem of elitism. By this term I mean the
tendency of a small privileged sector to dominate society and,
consciously or not, to regard its domination as legitimate and
desirable because of the cultural or intellectual inadequacy it
attributes to "nonelite" elements. The elite may be primarily
self-serving or they may use their power for the welfare of the
masses; but the critical points are that the elite actually have
highly disproportionate power, and that fundamentally they feel
justified to dominate others because of a durable, culturally
based disrespect for the capacities of nonelite elements.
According to Roderic H. Davison, "there always has been an elite
in one form or another [in Ottoman and Turkish society]. It has
been the ruling element and the moving element throughout Turkish
history--- Without the ruling group, Turkish history is
2
inexplicable."
2.1 Ottoman Empire
According to Frederick W. Frey, throughout most of the 
Ottoman Period, the composition of the political elite was 
remarkably consistent. Four major institutions occupied the
19
heights of power. These were the military, the bureaucracy,
the religious institution, and the court. These institutions
3
dominated the political life , the recruitment system 
established during the reign of Mehmet II, who created a 
governmental system staffed by the slaves of sultan. Earlier, 
non-Muslims were forcefully converted to Islam, given special 
training in special schools in Istanbul, forbidden marriage 
while on active duty, and attached to the person of sultan 
as his slaves. Later parents increasingly gave up their sons 
willingly in hopes of a bright future for them since capable boys 
could rise to the highest ranks of state administration, 
including the position of grand vezir, chief advisor to the 
sultan.
To enter the ruling group one needed to know the "Ottoman 
Hay", that is, to have mastered the hybrid language and behavior 
of Ottomans. This usually required education, either in one of 
the special schools or else through the education provided by a 
privileged family background. Thus, education by itself was the 
■ajor factor in being an elite in Ottoman Empire, and the major 
dividing line between the ruling group and the ruled.
It follows that a fundamental Ottoman legacy to contemporary 
Turkey was a political system in which the ruling elite held 
power. No bourgeoisie, hereditary landed aristocracy, or 
nongovernmental clergy existed with an independent source of 
power. Thus, the state and its rulers dominated the society.
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From the eighteenth century on, but most conspiciously in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, two distinct 
groups emerged within the ruling elite, differentiated by their 
reactions to the decline of the state. One group is usually
i
referred to as the "Westernizers", "modernizers" or "reformers". 
It consisted mainly of the young officers who were products of 
the new Western type of military schools, bureaucrats who had 
relatively modern education and who frequently had diplomatic 
contacts with the West, and some members of the intelligentsia 
such as journalists. For this group, the answer to Ottoman 
debility was modernization, defeating the European powers at 
their own game.
The opposed camp consisted of a coalition of 
■traditionalists." For much of the time, the "spearhead" of 
the resistence to modernization was a traditional contingent 
within the military, that is, the janissaries and the lower 
military personnel. Their reason for opposition was the fear of 
losing the privileged status that they were used to. Even more 
influential in the traditionalist cause however, were the 
clergy. Although the ulema, or the religious dignitaries, were 
divided among themselves, and altough an aristocratic element 
in its leadership sometimes supported specific modernizing 
reforms, in general it furnished the ideological justification 
for opposition.
21
2.2) Young Turks
The decline of the Empire and the lost wars proved the 
necessity for modernizing the Ottoman warfare. Western type of 
military schools were established during the nineteenth century. 
The specific education these schools offered and the effect of 
losing of territories to different ethnic groups within the 
Empire created a new branch of modernizing elites. Their first 
aim was to stop the dismemberment of the Empire. Following the 
First Constitutionalist Period (1876-1878), Abdulhamid II 
exiled most of them. The majority of the rest themselves left 
the country.
Abdulhamid II renewed government centralization, and 
expanded communications through telegraph lines and railroads. 
He expanded and modernized both military and professional 
education. Doing these he added new members to the modernizing 
elites. But, he did not pursue Ottomanism; he saw religion 
and his title of Caliph as the major unifying elements for the 
people living in Ottoman lands.
Abdulhamid II recognized the potential of the belief held by 
Europeans that the caliph-sultan could speak on matters of dogma 
because his authority paralleled that of the Pope. He made 
certain that the 1876 Constitution contained an article stating 
that the "Sultan as Caliph is protector of the Muslim
22
religion." With this policy of re-unifying the Empire by use of 
religion power, Abdulhamid II opposed the Western-educated 
modernizing elites.
The Young Turk movement began among those who were neither
young nor ethnically Turkish. The name seems to have originated
with La Jeune Turquie, published in France by a Lebanese
5
Moronite Christian Khalil Ghanim. Among the Young Turks were 
there different organizations. One group of the exiles was led by 
Prince Sabahaddin; this group argued that Ottomanism in its most 
liberal meaning was the best unifying element. Another faction 
was known first as Vatan, then as Vatan ve Hurriyet, and 
finally as Osmanli (Ottoman) Hurriyet. It consisted mainly 
of graduates of the War Academy in Istanbul, and included 
Mustafa Kemal. This group later merged with the Union and 
Progress, and was for a firm central government. All Young 
Turk groups were for radical changes and were formed and led by 
elites.
The Second Constitutional Period was initiated by the Young
Turks in 23 July 1908. The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)
had an overwhelming majority in the parliament. Even though they
were still ethnically and religiously diverse, with some
6
developments that led to their consolidation of power , they 
cherished radical changes. In the process, the CUP then turned 
to Turkism, and secularism. The opposition in the parliament
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was a liberal one, still claiming that Ottomanism was a sine qua 
non for reunification.
The Balkan Wars of 1912, and further secessions created 
serious doubts about the CUP, but the reconquest of Edirne by 
CUP ended in the expansionist hopes of its leadership. With the 
state limited to Anatolia and Arab lands except for eastern 
Thrace, the CUP, inaugurated new policies based on Turkish 
national ism.
By that time, the intelligentsia, especially Ziya Gokalp, 
came up with new ideas. According to this theoretician of the 
Young Turks, the nation was the highest moral authority and the 
intelligentsia were the natural leaders of the nation. Gokalp 
and his friends recommended the CUP executives to provide 
education in Turkish, and in a secular form. The elites were 
trying to reshape society which they needed for the first time 
for the survival of the state.
During this intra-elite struggle, the masses were not 
included in any of the debates. The modernizing elite never had 
a pluralistic approach. To change and to reconstruct the society 
was their mission and this mission would be realized with or 
without the society.
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2.3) The War of Independence and the Monoparty Period
The reexpansionist ideals of the CUP leadership led to the
7
entrance of the Empire to the World War I. Pan-Turkist policies 
put an end to Ottomanism as well as to the Ottoman Empire. Even 
though some limited successes were attained in the World War I, 
the offensive aims catastrophically failed and some parts of 
Anatolia were invaded.
A resistance movement to invasion emerged in Anatolia. 
Societies of Defense of Rights were established by the local and 
national elites. Some members of the CUP and some other 
political military and intellectual elite left Istanbul for 
Anatolia to support the resistance movements. The Amasya 
Protocol of June 22, 1919, Erzurum and Sivas Congresses of July 
23, 1919 and September 4, 1919, respectively, were the first 
signals of the new branch of elites aiming to save the Empire. 
A representative committee was elected for the execution of the 
nationalistic decisions of the congresses.
The resistance movements were not welcomed by the Istanbul 
government. Istanbul government was for a wait-and-see policy. 
According to the Istanbul government, the more the Ottomans will 
create obstacles for the invasion, the longer the invasion 
period will be. For this purpose they did not hesitate trying to 
eliminate the resistance movement. Thus, another intra-elite
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struggle, that did not come to an end until the establishment 
of the new Republic, emerged.
An interesting characteristic of the War of Independence 
period was that even the bulk of the nationalist elites did not 
realize that the major aim of the leadership of resistance 
movement was a republic. To unite the forces, Mustafa Kemal and 
his close friends never openly pronounced any claims against the 
Sultanate, or the Caliphate.
The fight was against the "invaders." Some of the 
intelligentsia, by that time, were seeing a mandate of one of 
the Western powers as the only way out. It was inconceivable 
that all of the members of the first Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, convened in 23 April, 1920, would share the same 
worldview. Consisting of some ex-members of the last Ottoman 
Parliament, local religious leaders, military officers and 
intellectuals, this assembly was the only place where all the 
forces for independence had come together. Socialists, 
Islamists, Turkists, traditionals were among its members. 
There were heated discussions on policies to be followed; often 
consensus was very difficult to obtain.
At the beginning of the War of Independence, the masses did 
not feel loyalty to the National Assembly. Motivating the masses 
was a very difficult job for the nationalist elites. The Balkan
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Wars, Libyan War and World War I had discouraged the masses from
enthusiastically supporting one more war. Promoted by the
Istanbul government and the invaders to some extent, six revolts
8
took place during the war. These revolts were quelled quickly
by force. This success of the National Assembly and the Greek
9
invasion activated the masses. This was the first time that the 
elite and the mass have fought hand in hand for the same purpose.
After the end of the War of Independence , the National
Assembly faced a difficult situation. Independence was
attained and the coalition was over. On November 1, 1922 the
sultanate was abolished. Not to provoke further resistance
Mustafa Kemal and his friends did not at this time abolish the
Caliphate. The winners of the war were popular all around of
10
the country and the first group of the National Assembly won 
the majority of the seats in the general elections and was 
organized as a political party: The People's Party was
established on September 9,1923.
With the proclamation of the republic, October 29, 1923, the 
People's Party (now Republican People's Party, RPP) began its 
reforms. Abolishing of the Caliphate, the unification of 
education, enacting the new constitution (1924), the abolishing 
of tekkes(dervish lodges), the acceptance of the international 
calendar, the adoption of new civil law, the acceptance of new 
alphabet, granting of women's political rights, the law of
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surname were the milestones of the modernization reforms of the 
Republican People's Party (RPP). Each being a revolution by 
itself, one can argue that almost everything was to be changed 
by the ruling elite. There were of course, opposition to 
these changes. The Progressive Republican Party (1924) and the 
Free Republican Party (1930) were two attempts of the opposing 
elites, both were eliminated, the former by a government 
decision, the latter by heavy persuasions. The masses resisted 
these changes by rebel ion and revolts: Sheyh Sait Rebellion on 
February 13, 1925, Menemen Event on December 23, 1930, Dersim 
Revolt in 1935-38. All of these actions were quelled in a 
bloody manner by the ruling elite. For the first time, the 
masses had opposed a group of elites, by forceful means.
2.4) Multi-party Political Elite
After the World War II, the democracy which had won the war 
was a very appealing concept. Truman Doctrine, the threat from 
the Soviet Union, and a demanding new bourgeoisie were the 
causes of the Turkish transition to democracy. Even though it 
was a monoparty government, the RPP leadership opened the way 
to multiparty politics as it was the ultimate aim of its 
founders. Democracy was considered as an end by that time. The 
traditionals, having learned their lessons, did not oppose this 
new move. Their calling was a more pluralistic government. They 
found massive support in the society during their period of
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opposition.
In 1950, the Democratic Party (DP) came to power. 
Supported by the newly rising bourgeoisie, large landowners and 
more importantly the masses which were demanding more goods and 
services from the government, they placed emphasis on national 
will. The leadership of the party was formed by the ex-members 
of the RPP. These leaders tried to pay-back the masses for the 
support that they had provided to the DP in the elections. The 
alliance of the local notables and the RPP was beaten by the DP 
and the masses. This was the first time that the masses became 
political actors.
Frederick W. Frey in one of his essays in 1979, wrote that:
Until quite recently, Turkish politics have been, for 
all major purposes, elite politics. As in most other 
developing societies, the political drama was limited 
to elite actors, elite institutions, and elite urban 
settings. Mass elements were excluded by the nature of 
the culture, the distribution of resources, and the 
design of the rulers. Thus until two decades ago an 
analysis of political elites in Turkey took a long way 
toward comprehending most of the meaningful political 
activities in the society. And even now, the main 
impact of the entry of mass elements into political life
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has been the change produced in elite interactions... It
therefore is still possible to analyze much of the
thrust of Turkish politics by focusing on the political
elite although this perspective will probably become
11
increasingly inadequate in the future.
In 1960, a military intervention took place. The
bureaucratic elite, the RPP, and the university youth almost 
invited this intervention. The liberal economic policies of the 
DP had caused inflationary economics which decreased the buying 
power of the officials. The DP's suppressive policy towards any 
opposition caused bitterness among the intelligentsia. Also, 
their mild attitude towards Islam created extreme dissatisfaction 
among the same groups. Educated elites formed a large
coalition to support the military intervention. Thus, following 
the intervention, two ministers, Polatkan and Zorlu, and the 
Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, who two days before the
intervention had spoken to 200.000 of his supporters in Izmir 
meeting, were hanged by court order. The masses did not even 
protest, there was no overt opposition to the military
intervention.
A new constitution was enacted in 1961. Political system 
was overhauled with addition of new institutions and
organizations. Strong control mechanisms on politicians were 
established in the form, among other things of the Constitutional
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Court and the National Security Council; top military officers
were included in the latter. Some of the National Union 
12
Committee members became "natural" senators of the newly 
established Senate, or the upper house. The 1961 Constitution 
also enlarged the scope of basic rights and liberties.
In 1965, the Justice Party (JP) came to power, receiving
52 percent of the votes. Established for "justice", this party
claimed that they were the followers of DP. During JP
administration relatively liberal economic policies were
pursued. The massive support to JP showed itself in 1969
elections, as well; JP obtained 47 percent of the votes. Being
13
of village origin, Suleyman Demirel had responded to the 
support given him by the masses by limiting the powers of
bureaucracy. Politics were once again polarized. The university 
youth, like their generation elsewhere, became militant in
their opposition. Anti-American groups had their representatives 
in the National Assembly, too; the Turkish Workers Party was 
the representative of the socialist elites. Thus, the RPP moved 
to the left of the center, but protected its bureaucratic elite 
characteristics. Organized political agitation, international 
events, and other factors combined to stimulate both the left 
and right wing violence. The JP governments response was, on 
the whole, consistently moderate - in fact, too much for the 
military who felt that things were again getting out of hand.
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In March 1971, the military issued an ultimatum that 
effectively deposed the Demirel government, replacing it with a 
neutral above party administration led by technocrats. Martial 
law was proclaimed in many areas, houses searched, thousands 
imprisoned. Since the military declined to make, or realized
they were incapable of, a full and lasting governmental take­
over, they were dependent on cooperation from the parties, who 
cleverly used this dependence and increasingly alienated public
opinion to pry the military away from its second intervention.
14
After this intervention Bülent Ecevit and Süleyman Demirel 
acted together not to ratify military's favored candidate (the 
former Chief of General Staff - Gürler) for the presidency,
even though Ecevit and Demirel were the leaders of the two
competing parties in deep conflict.
Turkish politics in the 1970s was characterized by
fragmentation and polarization, and by a lack of decisive
15
authority on the part of the government. Polarization came to 
characterize not only the parties, but pervaded other important 
social sectors as well, including organized labor, the teaching 
profession, the civil bureaucracy, and even the police. The 
partisanship reached its peak, so did the political 
assassinations. Inter-ethnic and inter-sectarian cleavages 
caused massive outbreaks of communal conflict. The rampant 
inflation, accompanied by serious industrial slowdowns and
shortages of consumer and import goods and an average of 20
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political assasinations per day, added fuel to the fire.
The third military intervention took place on 12 September
16
1980. According to Frank Tachau and Metin Heper , this 
intervention was multifaceted, including economic breakdown, 
civil violence, and open challenges to such highly symbolic 
values as secularist state. But in the eyes of the military 
elite, all these facets fused into one major failure of the 
system: the complete erosion of governmental authority. To re­
establish this authority radical measures were taken: earlier on
former political leaders were placed in a military camp; 
political parties were abolished; almost all the active
politicians were banned from politics; a new constitution was
17
enacted (1982) and Kenan Evren was elected president in the 
same referendum. Only three parties were allowed to compete in 
the elections of 1983. Labor, bureaucracy, university, and 
all the politicized sectors were "cleansed".
1980 military intervention thus aimed and succeeded the 
depolitization of the society. Military elite, confronting all 
other political actors, tried to pacify society. In this 
endeavour, they had popular support; 92 percent of the voters 
accepted the new constitution and the presidency of Kenan Evren.
Today, the government of Turkey is a coalition of two 
parties which were not allowed to participate at the 1983
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elections, the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) and the 
True Path Party (TPP). Their overall support is very close to 
fifty percent. The SDPP claims itself to be the follower of the 
RPP, and the TPP to be the follower of the JP. According to 
these parties, the Motherland Party, in alliance with the 
military, created an erosion in all democratic and political 
institutions, and also suppressed the lower and middle-classes 
by its economic policies.
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6. By that time revolts occurred in Bulgaria, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as well as the announcement in Crete of union 
with Greece. These reverses experienced by the Ottoman State 
strengthened the hands of anti-Christian forces in 
parliament and eroded support for decentralizers.
7. Pan-Turkism aims at the unification of all Turkic peoples, 
namely the Turks of Central Asia, China, what is now the 
Southwestern part of ex-Soviet Union, Turkey, Iraq, Western 
Thrace, Iran, Cyprus.
8. Anzavur, Bolu-Düzce-Hendek, Konya, Milli Aşireti, Yozgat, 
and Tcherkess Ethem revolts, all in 1920.
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9. In August 1921, Mustafa Kemal sent National Tax Orders to 
all the towns. National Tax Commissions, nationalized
40 percent of the clothes, oil, tires etc. that people 
owned. All the males under 40 were called to the military 
service. To achieve these ends Independence Courts were 
established and were furnished with great powers.
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12. The military committee formed after the intervention.
13. The leader of the Justice Party.
14. The new leader of the Republican People's Party.
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16. Ibid., p.25.
17. General Kenan Evren, the leader of the military 
intervention. Evren was Chief of the General Staff at the 
time of intervention.
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Chapter Three
TURKISH NATIONALISM: A BRIEF HISTORY
Who is ethnically a Turk? Historically, the Turks were
nomadic peoples tightly organized into lineages, clans, and
federations, and occupying the plains of Central Asia for at
least three millenia. However, these Altaic-speaking peoples,
probably due to overpopulation and the shrinking resources of the
Asian steppes, surged westward and southwest into what is now
eastern Europe and Turkey in several waves of migrations.
Settled by their tribal of feudal leaders in conquered lands,
especially in Anatolia and in eastern Europe in the period
preceding the Ottoman Empire, they mixed with indigenous 
1
population.
As the Balkan countries severed themselves from the Ottoman
Empire and became sovereign states in their own rights, the
majority of Muslims fled to Anatolia. They were resettled
(especially after the Balkan wars and the World War I) in
northwestern Turkey, often occupying land formerly inhabited by
the displaced Anatolian Greeks. Also, Crimean Turks fled
before the Russian conquest of their homeland, migrated to the
Caucasus and Georgia, and from there to present-day Turkey,
2
hoping to preserve their Islamic faith and distinctive cultures.
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3.1) The Roots of Turkish Nationalism
3.1.1) Ottoman Millet System
The millet system had its origin in the basic Islamic
concept of dhimmi (or. zimmi) that is, the recognition accorded
to, Jews and Christians as the "Peoples of the Book." The Muslim
states had a strong religious mandate to protect non-Muslim
citizens by subjecting the relations between them and the
predominanty Muslim society in which they lived to government
control. Thus a strong, wel1-organized, and law-abiding Muslim
3
government was the best guarantee for the rights of non-Muslims.
To the Ottomans, government was the art of ruling the
unruly, reconciling the irreconcilable, and creating harmony
out of ethnoreligious discord. The method selected to accomplish
these ends was that of reinforcing the religious and social
differences among its subjects, with clearly defined boundaries
designed to minimize trespass and the resulting intergroup
strife, while assuring each group its place in the
administrative structure and guaranteeing its communal rights,
so that these groups would not feel oppressed either by the
4
central government or by other groups.
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The ruling elites used the Turkish tradition of faith to the 
state to legitimize their authority in their effort to
consolidate the community. The Ottomans stressed its religious 
rather than ethnic basis in the belief that religion generated 
stronger feelings of solidarity than blood and kinship. This 
approach was consistent with the pre-Ottoman pattern of
organization in the territories they occupied, where the
religious-ethnic community was in fact the basic unit of 
political organization but was not formally recognized as such 
within a constitutional framework.
The Ottoman's intentional promotion of the community,
notably the religious community, as the unit of the
administrative organization had not begun during the period of
growth in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when the
Ottoman state was predominantly an ethnic Turkish entity. The
policy in question was generated in the fifteenth century, when
the inclusion of large non-Turkic and non-Muslim groups turned
the state into an empire in which groups of different religious
5
persuasions were the main divisions. The millet system evolved 
over the second half of the fifteenth century, during which the 
Christian Orthodox millet (under the Greek Orthodox Patriarch), 
the Armenian millet (which included all the non-Orthodox Eastern 
Christians), and, finally, the Jewish millet were successively 
established.
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The Ottoman State carried out the mandate to provide a place
for non-Muslims with a high degree of sophistication. It
concentrated its organizational efforts on the three broad
categories of non-Muslim religious faith, but did not try to
eliminate all the interfaith divisions stemming from the
different ethnic characteristics of various groups so long as
those ethnic characteristics were useful in consolidating the
6
community and especially the state. In practice there was
considerable diversity within the apparently homogeneous
religious groups. The Orthodox and Armenian millets were
officially led by their respective patriarchs and synods, but
they had subdivisions- bishoprics and parishes- that followed
7
ethnic and linguistic lines.
Some argue that the tight adherence of non-Muslims to
their ethnic-religious identities and communities strengthened
their resistance to Ottoman rule and, incidentally, to
conversion and assimilation into the Muslim Society. The
opposite was true with regard to their relationship with the
Ottoman government, for that government assured the survival of
their communities as separate ethnoreligious entities; the
rights of local self-government and cultural-religious autonomy
were not special privileges granted to these particular groups,
8
but were Ottoman constitutional principles. The government lost 
the allegiance of these smaller groups only when it failed to 
restrain the larger groups from actions that threathened their
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ethnie integrity and autonomy.
The situation of the Muslim community was different from 
that of the non-Muslims. The Muslims were not officially 
recognized as a separate millet, although certain organizational 
features, such as the recognition accorded Şeyhülislam as the 
head of the Muslim community, were similar to those of the 
millets. However, the administrative power of the chief mufti 
were rendered relatively insignificant, his duties related to 
the administration of the Muslim community being assumed directly 
by the government.
While the Ottoman government took its legitimacy from Islam 
and enforced, to the extent possible, Islamic legislation, it 
did not identify itself politically and ideologically with the 
Muslim community until the late nineteenth century. As a ruling 
group the Ottoman elites had as little to do with ordinary 
Muslims as with the non-Muslims. The government power was the 
preserve of the Muslims, but it was available only to those 
Muslims - some of whom were converts - who first accepted 
everything the ruling order stood for. The Muslim's sense of 
religious identity deepened and came to supersede all other group 
and subgroup identities under the program to develop the 
ethnoreligious community as the basic unit of the constitutional 
system. The average Muslim knew that he lived under an Islamic 
government, but he knew too that he had no political power.
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Only in the nineteenth century did he consciously begin to
9
consider the government and the state as "his".
The Muslim community encompassed a great number of ethnic
and linguistic groups. Before it became a predominantly imperial
entity, the early Ottoman state recognized these ethnic
divisions. Islamic doctrine explicitly recognizes ethnic and
tribal differences, but it forbids the use of tribal and
10
national affiliation to achieve domination over other Muslims. 
Despite dedication to their new Muslim identity, the Bosnians 
and the Albanians nonetheless continued to preserve their 
separate ethnic-linguistic identity. Kurdish lords and Turkmen 
chiefs were given appointment letters as boz millet and kara 
millet respectively, though these letters were without political 
significance. Although in practice various groups, especially 
in the countryside, did maintain ethnic and/or linguistic 
distinctiveness, the emphasis on religion as the foundation of 
the community, and the co-opting into the ruling system of the 
Muslim tribal chiefs, heads of leading families, and communal 
leaders, reduced the bases of the appeal of ethnic and 
linguistic consciousness. And throughout the existence of the 
Ottoman state, in all of its censuses, the Muslims were listed 
as one group and were never categorized according to ethnic or 
linguistic differences.
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3.1.2) Dismemberment of the Empire and its Conclusions
The nineteenth century brought change in the traditional 
ethnoreligious communities based Ottoman political system and 
also in the entire range of group-identity symbols and
priorities. Critical here was the transformation of the
ethnoreligious identities among non-Muslims into national 
identities with ethnicity as the basis of the new nationality.
The changes in the Ottoman social structure and the 
weakening of the central authority encouraged the rise of local 
ethnic and particular!'st tendencies in the form of a movement 
toward decentralization. The increased trade with Europe, and 
the economic, political, and military supremacy of the West, 
led to the rise of new merchant and intellectual classes among 
the non-Muslims. This change caused a drastic transformation in 
the structure, philosophy, and identity of the non-Muslim 
millets, especially the Christians, who broke up into smaller 
groups in which ethnic and linguistic affinity became outwardly 
the basis of identity. The Greek revolt of 1821, which 
undermined the authority of the patriarch as the leader of the 
Orthodox community, was the turning point for both the millets 
and the Ottoman government. After the uprising, the government's 
view of its non-Muslim subjects altered, and there was a change
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of consciousness in the millets. For non-Muslim minorities
foreign conferences organized by Western states became sounding 
boards for airing internal grievances that had once been 
channeled through representative institutions in the Empire. But 
this foreign intervention, probably intentionally, increased
rather than resolved tensions.
The mass immigration from Ottoman territories under
Christian threat began in the 1860s and reached its peak in 1878,
and turned the Ottoman state into a predominantly Muslim entity.
In addition, some structural, administrative, political
changes that culminated in the establishment of new nations in
the Balkans produced also the necessary class conditions for the
transformation of the traditional Muslim community into a non- 
11
Muslim nation. The disintegration of the traditional social 
and occupational structure, the demographic changes resulting 
from the massive immigrations, the settlement of the nomadic
tribes, and an internal migration from rural to urban area, the 
introduction of a capitalistic economic system, the changes made 
in the administrative and political systems - all these combined 
to turn the Ottoman State into a different sociopolitical entity, 
a territorial state which was still Muslim in character.
A1tough it had all the characteristics of a modern nation, 
it was basically a politicized and enlarged community united by 
bonds of Islamic solidarity. The individual allegiance and
loyalty of one part of the intelligentsia were transferred from 
the sultan to the impersonal national Muslim state.
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3.1.3) Ottomanism
Ottoman decentralizers of all ethnic groups cooperated in 
search of a new national formula. This formula had to be a 
factor to let the survival of the Empire and to reunify all of 
the ethno-religious and ethno-1inguistic groups.
Ottomanism emerged as the solution. According to 
Ottomanists, a decentralized federal state in which all 
minorities and ethnic groups will have a voice was the best 
solution for the reunification. Under a constitutional monarch, 
the sultan, an English type of state would satify aspirations 
of all minorities, especially of Armenians who still hoped to 
stay within the Empire.
But Ottoman leaders, reacted defensively. According to 
them, although the Ottomanists' claims were consistent with the 
traditions, the territorial Muslim state would be destroyed by 
this system.
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3.1.4) Pan-1si amism
As already noted Abdiil hamid II renewed government
centralization after he consolidated his power and exiled the
leaders of the Ottomanists. He expanded communication through
telegraph lines and railroads. Bookprinting and newspaper
publication spread, bringing both Muslim and non-Muslim subjects
into contact with the printed word. During his reign,
education and learning received government attention as primary
12
and secondary, teacher training courses were expanded as well.
Abdiilhamid II became the official symbol of Pan-Islamism,
a movement that aimed to reunify the Muslim world under a caliph:
He used Pan-Islamism not only to help sustain his own power in
what was left of the Empire, but also to extend it.
Construction of the Hijaz Railway to facilitate the pilgrimage
to Makka and Madina and the sending of emissaries to distant
Muslim lands represented two aspects of this thrust. Even though
13
the sultan was not of Quraysh descent, many Muslims accepted 
his claims.
The individual Muslim citizens gradually came to identify 
themselves with the new Ottoman ' Musiim nation, formed of 
different tribes and ethnic groups but having Islam as its 
binding ideology and Turkish as its official language. This was
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a territorial state, the motherland, the vatan, to which
ideally, all the Muslims would feel allegiance and loyalty.
Implicit in the development of a supreme vatan was that its
survival and welfare took precedence over the rule of the sultan,
who could be challenged and deposed when his presence and
policies became detrimental to the interests of the nation and
vatan. Moreover, the idea that certain conditions within the
motherland could be improved so as to strengthen the nation and
14
make life better for the Muslims gained acceptance.
Abdulhamid II played a vital role, using his policy of 
Islamism to shape the identity of the emerging Muslim nation. 
His task was basically a secular attempt, but he approached it 
in purely religious terms and relied on absolutist power to carry 
his policies to build a modern Muslim nation, with the Ottoman 
building blocks. Thus, he alienated the liberal intelligentsia 
and even some of his own religious followers.
3.1.5) Turkism, Pan-Turkism, Pan-Turanism
At this time internal opposition to Abdülhamid II, and the 
Ottomanists who were exiled, were in a process of organization. 
Concentrated mostly in the military schools, and in Europe, 
secret associations which demanded liberty were established one 
after another.
47
The Committee of Union and Progress was one of these 
organizations. Its name explaining its aims of "union" of the 
Empire and "progress" on the modernization direction, CUP 
gained strength in Macedonia and Salonica. It was for a firm 
central government in which all the ethnic groups would live in 
peace. With their organized power they made AbdQlhamid II agree 
to recall the Ottoman Parliament on July 23, 1908.
The restoration of parliament had the effect of taking the 
wind out of the revolutionaries' sails. Their failure in solving 
the problems created obstacles for their planned reforms. After 
consolidating its power CUP, hand in hand with Armenian
nationalist Dashnag Party and other minorities, introduced 
programs in the old Ottomanist spirit, even though the discord 
among ethnic groups was not ended. Education at the intermediate 
and higher levels was to be conducted in Turkish, secular 
education was expanded at all levels, with women in higher 
education though segregated. A secular nationalism was to be 
fol1 owed.
Alongside separatist nationalisms arose a Turkish
nationalism. If subject peoples insisted on their own identity,
15
so too would Turks. By that time the ideas of some
nationalists, but especially those of Ziya Gokalp, were 
affecting the elites.
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Turkism, like other currents of thought, came into being
to find a new foundation for the Empire's political existence and
cultural reconstruction. Turkists found this in Turkish culture.
Until then, "Turk" denoted the Muslim peasants and nomads who
spoke Turkish and "its application to the Ottoman gentlemen of
16
Istanbul would have been an insult." But according to
Turkists, without the cultivation of Turkish culture, there
could be no genuine reform and modernization. The stimulation of
Turkism and the transformation of the self-conception of the
17
Turks was based on four factors: the disintegration of the
Ottoman millet system, the decline of the idea of Islamism by 
the national movements of the Muslim groups, the development of 
nationalism among the Turkic speaking peoples in Russia, and 
the rise in Europe of political interest in Turkic speaking 
peoples and of Turcology in the nineteenth century.
The first two of these factors were discussed above. Turning 
to the third factor, several nationalists emigrated from Russia 
to the Ottoman Empire gave impetus to Turkism. Yusuf Ak$ura, 
Ahmet Agao§lu, Halim Sabit, Mirza Fethi, Ali Ahinzade, Zeki 
Velidi Togan with their actions and writings underlined the 
ethnic ties of Anatolian Turks with other Turks. Also, national 
and racial ideas were introduced to the Empire from Europe. 
Authors such as Josepf de Gruignes, Abel Remusat, Stanislas 
Julien, Henrich Julitas Klaproth, Edouard Chavannes, Wilhelm 
Thomson, Arminus Vambery, Leon Cahun, and Arthur Lambey Davids
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were claimed to have had a formative influence on the Turkist
leaders by cultivating a new consciousness of Turkish history and 
18
language.
The CUP was influenced by the Turkish notion of national 
identity. With the additive effect of the Balkan Wars during 
which they realized that it was almost impossible to reunify all 
the ethnic minorities of the Empire, they shifted to an ethnic 
Turkish nationalism, mostly influenced by Ziya Gokalp.
The ideological basis of modern Turkish nationalism came 
from the works of Ziya Gokalp, a writer and sociologist who had 
been strongly influenced by Western thought. According to him, 
national sentiment was based on race, geography, political 
affinity, and chiefly culture - a culture made up of a common
language, religion, system of ethics and art. Gokalp believed
that Islam was an intrinsic ingredient of Turkish nationalism, 
but that it should be separated from the state and modernized so 
as to rid it of backward oriental characteristics. Its political 
ideas were influenced by collectivism: the individual self would
find its social personality in collective enthusiasm.
An intellectual elite would lead society, helping the 
masses to express their dormant "true native" values through the 
development of a folk culture that united the nation in a 
linguistic group with a common education, religion, morality,
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and esthetic ideal. Civilization, as distinct from culture, 
was material and practical. According to Gôkalp, the Turks had 
a rich indigeneous culture, but were poor in civilization. 
While rejecting European culture, Turkey should, he believed, 
accept its civilization.
The national economic structure was in turn to mix the best
aspects of socialism and capitalism. The capitalist system would
be replaced by occupational unions and guilds bound together by
national solidarity. To achieve economic progress, however,
local industry would have to be supported against foreign
competition; foreign advice and such controls as the
capitulations and the Public Debt Commission would have to be
abolished; and Islamic restrictions on and interference with
19
capital investment would have come to an end.
The CUP leadership adopted the recommendations of Gôkalp. 
They tried to transform the Islamic nation, in which Turks and 
Arabs were the main actors, into an ethnic Turkish state on the 
basis of the European ethnic-national model. Their secularism 
which aimed essentially at eliminating the clerics' influence in 
the government, and their positivism were viewed by both Arab 
and non-Arab Muslims as directed at the essence of the newly 
emerging Musiim-Ottoman nation. The CUP realized that it had 
made a fatal mistake by adopting secular nationalism as state 
policy.
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Then CUP leaders, especially Enver Pasha, made a
suicidal mistake to overcome the fatal one. With the aim of
gaining new territories and new allies to be unified with, he
adopted Pan-Turkism which was an ideal of the unity of all the
20
Turkic speaking peoples. It was launched by the immigrants of
Russia. By the World War I this irredentist Turkism "was adopted
as a guiding principle of state policy by an influential group
among the Young Turks who were determining the Empire's 
21
destiny." It was, however, this war that ended in disaster, 
which brought final discredit to irredentist ambitions.
3.2) The Development of Modern Turkish Nationalism
Following World War I the Ottoman Empire was not an empire 
anymore. It was disunited by and for the several ethnic groups 
that once created it. Also, most of its territories were invaded 
by the winners of the war.
The Defense of Rights movement and the War of Independence 
had begun against the imperialistic aims of the invaders. There 
was neither an ideological base nor a demand for the change in 
the political system. The goal to be attained was the ejection 
of the invaders; it was only a territoriality based struggle.
The first genuine nationalist sentiment among the masses 
developed during the Turko-Greek War between 1919-22. Greeks
52
identified their enemies as Turks, so did reciprocally the 
people in Anatolia. When the war ended with the glory of the 
resistants, there was a geographic area which was freed from the 
invaders, but not a state which was accepted by all its people.
3.2.1) Monoparty Nationalism
3.2.1.1.) National Compromise and its Territorial Conclusions
Turkey's importance is usually recognized in geopolitical 
terms. It is seen as the bridge between Europe and Asia -
between West and East. It is valued for its control over the 
crucial waterways linking the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and 
Atlantic. Its agricultural potential and its resources of water 
and some other materials make the territory of Asia Minor an 
important one.
During the War of Independence, the Ottoman Parliament of
22
Istanbul declared a national compromise. The national borders 
were described as the ones of present day Turkey with the 
addition of Musul, where there are oil resources. In Western 
Thrace and Arab countries plesbicites were to be made. This 
compromise was adopted by the leaders of Anatolian forces. The 
Lausanne Treaty (July 24, 1923), approved these borders with the 
exception of Musul; the latter was a matter of discord
between Turkey and United Kingdom. The League of Nations
faciliated the reaching of a reconciliation. In June 1926, Turkey
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accepted English rights on Musul; Turkey was to receive some 
part of the oil revenues. In 1936, with Montreux Treaty Turkey 
obtained its control on the straits which were governed by an 
international commission until then. With the inclusion of 
Alexendretta to Turkey on June 23, 1939, the new state 
consolidated its authority on its present day territories.
3.2.1.2) Reforms of the New Government
After the abolishing of the Sultanate (November 1,1922), it 
was clear that a new political entity had been emerging. This 
view gained support when the second assembly was held in 11 
August 1923 with a great majority of Anatolian and Rumelian 
Defense of Rights Groups. These groups organized themselves as 
the People's Party (later the Republican People's Party) and 
initiated a radical reform program.
Early changes implemented by the RPP government included 
separation of religion and the state, abolition of control by 
religious groups over wakf (religious foundations) bodies, the 
termination of the Sharia courts' authority, an end to religious 
schools, and introduction of coeducation. Wearing of clothing 
associated with religion was banned. The previously modern head- 
gear, the fez, was to be replaced after 1925 by hats. With 
the abolition of Sharia came also an end to the millet system. 
Armenians, Greeks, and Jews renounced their right to be judged
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according to their own religious laws, and placed themselves 
under the rule of the new Turkish legislation.
To replace the old personal status laws, the Turkish 
government in 1926 resorted to adopting Swiss civil code. Under 
the new law, polygamy and the practice of repudiation allowed to 
men in marriage were to disappear. The law gave women equal 
rights in marriage and divorce. European penal and commercial 
codes were introduced.
In the other efforts to cut off the population from the 
Islamic Ottoman past, the Republicans substituted a European 
calendar for the Islamic one and abandoned the practice of 
beginning the new day with sunset. Because the RPP objected to
the complete covering of women associated with Islam, it made 
several attempts to forbid them wearing the veil that covered not 
only the head but also the face. But no laws were passed 
requiring women to unveil. In 1924, nontaxpaying men could 
vote. Six years later women voted in local elections for the 
first time. In 1934, not only women were allowed to vote in 
national elections but they also had the opportunity to run for 
office. Nearly 5 percent of the Parliament in 1935 was composed 
of women.
The 1924 Constitution contained the clause "The Religion of 
the Turkish State is Islam" (Article 2) . In April, 1928 this
55
clause was dropped. However, full freedom to choose a religion 
did not come about until 1934.
These secular reforms were not sufficient for a concrete 
national identity. To promote Turkish identity, the RPP strove 
to eliminate Arabic influences by decreeing that the call to 
prayer should be made in Turkish. Persian and Arabic words were 
targeted for replacement, too. In 1928, the Turkish government 
replaced the old Arabic script with a new Latin script. The new
Latin Turkish alphabet was simpler than the Arabic. The RPP 
regarded it as a vehicle for the expansion of literacy. It 
facilitated creation of a new past and a new future for Turkey. 
Young people in state schools would be cut off from all past 
writings except those the government chose to print in the new 
alphabet.
Ottoman history too, became the target of a Turkish
revisionism often highly chauvinistic in outlook and content.
History being the major tie with the Ottoman past, official
research projects were launched to prove that originally Turks
came from Central Asia, Turkish language and civilization were
the source of all others and that the minority groups in the
23
country were in fact of Turkish origin. History, in other 
words, was rewritten to enhance Turkishness and to minimize 
Ottoman and Islamic identity.
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3.2.1.3) Reactions to Reforms and the Response of the Republican 
People's Party
To digest these reforms was very difficult for the 
traditional elites and masses. Revolts and rebellions took place 
in the monoparty period, sometimes carrying ethnic 
characteristics.
On February 13, 1925, began the Sheykh Sait rebellion. 
Although the Kurds constituted an ethnolinguistic rather than 
religious entity, frustration of their nationalist inspirations 
and fixing of regional boundaries left them divided and unhappy. 
The monoparty regime, by trying to impose secularist-ethnic 
Turkish nationalism, added fuel to the fire. The 1925 revolt 
despite its religious overtones and leadership, represented a 
protest by the Kurds against the government's abolition in 1924 
of all Kurdish societies, schools, publications, and 
institutions, including the religious ones. The Kurds had 
expected to be given special treatment for having aided 
suppression of the Armenians in the east in the 1910s. The 
revolt was quelled quickly. Over fifty Kurdish leaders were 
executed in Diyarbakır and another four hundred were killed in 
Elazığ. The Turkish government convinced the foreign press that 
the revolt represented religious reaction, not a move toward 
independence.
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On December 23, 1930, a group of Naqshibendi sectarians and 
some local religious groups staged a revolt in Menemen, a town 
in the province of Izmir. They killed Lieutenant Kubilay who 
was trying to stop them, and, cut his head off. The government 
reacted quickly and all the participants were caught and hanged. 
This event was protested all around the country by the youth in 
meetings organized by the government.
Another Kurdish revolt in 1929, aided by Iran, provoked 
military intervention in eastern Turkey. The Kurds lost when 
Iran withdrew its aid, and Turkish forces surrounded the rebels 
from Iranian territory. The Turkish government approved the 
killing of thousands of Kurdish civilians. From 1935 to the end 
of 1938, residents of the remote area of Dersim fought the 
Turkish army rather than acquiesce to deportation which that 
ensued. The Kurds lost again when their ammunition ran out.
3.2.1.4) The Monoparty After Atatürk
During the 1930s there was a reawakening of a racist and 
irredentist Turkism which clashed with the official Turkish 
nationalism. The RPP elite aimed at promoting a Turkish 
identity and unity, for the purposes of nation-building; their 
nationalism was not chauvinistic. The emerging, Turanist- 
Turkist version of nationalism differed from the secular 
nationalism of the RPP. The proponents of the Turanist-Turkist
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version of nationalism tried to develop a sense of extreme
24
patriotism and pride in Turkishness.
Nazi racial theories and the rise of Nazism as a political
movement were crucial influences. Several racist and irredentist
journals (such as Atsız Mecmua, Orhun, Biriik, Ergenekon and
Bozkurt) appeared in the 1930s. The World War II raised their
aggressiveness. The President of Republic, ismet İnönü, was
for the preservation of Turkey's neutrality throughout the war.
The Soviet Union pressured Turkey to supress irredentist
activities. Turkey officially declared that it had no
territorial ambitions and, to placate Soviet suspicions,
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increased its surveillance of Turkist Activities. This
resulted in the repression of the Turkists in 1944. More than 
thirty leading Turkists, including Nihal Atsız, Necdet
Sancar, Zeki Velidi Togan, and Alparslan Türkeş, were 
arrested. Several Turkist periodicals were closed down. These 
attempts to cut off all the ties between the state ideology of 
nationalism and Turkism/Pan-Turkism, resulted in the strong 
militant feelings among the latter's supporters, and in an anti­
communist, anti-Soviet and anti-left Turkist discourse.
3.2.1.5) Nationalism Conception of Republican People's Party
Until the launching of multi-party politics and even after, 
the primary goal of monoparty nationalism was to construct a 
nation state, create a new national identity and foster national
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The reconstructionunity and integration out of parochialism.
of the new state and society was to be achieved by the state led
civilan-military bureaucracy merged within the RPP, and in
accordance with the "Six Arrows" which became the state ideology
27
in 1937; these were republicanism, nationalism,
28 29 30 31
revolutionism, secularism, etatism, and populism.
To be a bond for social cohesion hypernationalism was 
necessary. This hypernationalism, based on myths and other 
symbols, never became a chauvinism or a racism and even 
expansionism. Turkish ethnic culture - and some rediscovered past 
culture - was imposed to the citizens of the Turkish Republic. 
According to Atatürk, everyone who considered himself a Turk 
was a Turk. This broad definition of Turkishness eliminates all 
the doubts about a chauvinist nationalism. Also, according to 
all Turkish constitutions after the Republic, the citizenship 
rights of any citizen of the country, whatever his race,
religion, creed were, had been taken under security.
For Atatürk, Pan-Turkism was an impossible ideal. He
indicated that in the past all attempts to unify some nations
under a central government always failed. He described his
national policy as that of surviving and progressing in the 
33
national borders. He argued that they did not follow Turanism
ideals intentionally; for a country like Turkey it would have
34
been a too ambitious undertaking.
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But he did not follow this view himself. Even though League 
of Nations mandate for Syria prevented altering its boundaries, 
he wanted Alexandretta annexed to Turkey. He was less pleased 
when the results of elections in November 1937 assured minority 
status for Turks there. As the clouds of war gathered, France 
agreed to allow Turkish troops to occupy Alexandretta. The 
French presence gave Turks an advantage in securing a majority in 
the subsequent elections of 1938. Alexandretta was renamed as 
Hatay, and was set up as an independent entity. It immediately 
called for union with Turkey. In July 1939, France acceded to 
Turkey's annexation of Alexandretta in exchange for a 
nonaggression pact that would assure Turkey's neutrality during 
World War II. The Syrians, however, never accepted the 
detachment of Hatay from Syria.
Although Atatiirk's nationalism conception and that of the 
RPP's were territoriality based, he used deeply ethnic policies 
for achieving national unity. The main aim of their nationalism 
was to reach the contemporary level of civilization.
3.2.2) Multi-Party Politics and Nationalism
After World War II, the monoparty government decided 
that it was time for democracy and launched multiparty 
politics. This decision was caused by some internal and external 
factors. Among the leaders of the party one group was in doubts
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about the potential political organizations which will oppose the
reforms; there were two experiences which were consistent with 
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these doubts. According to this group, secularism being the 
core of all the revolution, any threat toward this concept was 
to be eliminated.
The Democratic Party prepared itself for government during 
the period it was in opposition, 1946-1950. Its leaders being 
more moderate on religion and prone to a more liberal system, 
the party gained popular support and came to the government in 
1950. One of its first performances was to convert the call to 
prayer from Turkish to Arabic, since the voters demanded this 
from the government. Another challenge to the reforms was on the 
etatism principle of RPP; liberal and somewhat inflationary 
economic policies were launched by the DP. For increasing their 
votes the DP followed populistic policies. The official state 
conception of nationalism was kept, whereas religion was allowed 
to be one of the factors that shaped Turkish culture, but not 
national identity.
On the other hand, after World War II, with the
changes in international politics, repression of the Turkists 
came to an end. In the aftermath of the war, while the Soviet 
Union made territorial demands and applied pressure for Turkey to 
revise the Montreux Treaty, the USA, in accordance with the 
Truman Doctrine, granted Turkey military and economic
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assistance. It was now the turn of communist groups to be
suppressed while several new Turkist organizations were permitted 
36
to appear. With the advent of multi-party politics, and the 
liberalization of issues pertaining to religion, an interest in 
Islam began to surface in some, although not all, Turkist groups 
and periodicals because of the anti-religious policies of the ex- 
Soviet Union on the outer Turks. The stance of Islam formed the 
major dividing line among the Turkist groups.
Three major types of Turkish nationalism were present in 
Turkey before the 1960 military intervention, of which two were 
political party views. The RPP continued its secular 
nationalism. The DP's nationalism was based on all of the 
concepts that form RPP's nationalism, but included liberal 
economic policies and religion, the religion freed of its 
orthodox meaning. Militant Turkists, on the other hand, were for 
Pan-Turkism in its genuine sense.
The 1960 military intervention was made by a 38-member
junta. Some members of the National Unity Committee into which
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the junta members organized themselves, advocated the
prolongation of the military rule and the implementation of
cultural and technical reforms for establishing a truly radical
nationalist state. However, "the fourteen" as they were called
including some founding members of the Nationalist Action Party,
were ousted five months later by the majority of the junta
38
members who expounded Kemalism of a moderate type.
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The 1961 Constitution liberalized press censorship and
adopted freer attitudes toward organized political activity.
Thus, the new Constitution established a fertile ground for
political organization. Like other groups, the Turkists took
advantage of these new conditions and founded numerous
organizations. In 1965, the conservative Republican Peasants'
and Nation Party was taken over by a group which included several
acknowledged Turkists including Alpaslan Ttirke§ and nine of "the
fourteen". After a reorganization of the party, they changed
its name to Nationalist Action Party (NAP) in 1969, and
established a strictly hierarchical party structure in which
loyalty was the most valuable asset. Thus, militant Turkist
39
nationalism found itself a home in a political party.
The DP was closed after the 1961 military intervention. The 
successor Justice Party (JP) maintaned the DP version of 
nationalism.
The major change in the 1970s was the founding of the 
National Salvation Party (NSP) which was a pro-Islamic party. 
All the ideologies which were tried to unify the Empire, with 
the exception of Ottomanism, were adopted by political parties 
and thus came to have proponents in the Parliament: Pan-Islamism 
continued with the NSP, Pan-Turkism with the NAP, the CUP's, 
■onoparty's and Ziya Gokalp's secular nationalism with the RPP,
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the DP's nationalism with the JP.
In 1975 and in 1977 Nationalist Front coalitions were
established by the JP, NAP and NSP. These coalitions, and some
40
other factors already mentioned, exacerbated the differences
between the Left and the Right wings, and terrorism took 20
victims per day in the summer of 1980. Marxist-Leninist, Maoist
and other leftist groups gained ground and became effective
among even the police. The "Idealist" movement, the militant
action of the Turkists came as a reaction, aiming "to protect
the state". Hearths of the ideal became the largest group of the
Turkists, allegedly numbering 100.000 members in the late 
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1970s. Before 1980 military intervention, districts,
streets, universities, some high schools and government agencies
were partitioned into camps of the Right and the Left; even
carrying a "wrong" newspaper in a district controlled by the
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opposite group could put one's life in jeopardy.
On 12 September 1980, the military once again came to 
power. General Kenan Evren, the leader of the military junta
stated:
The aim of the operation is to safeguard the integrity of 
the country, to provide for national unity and 
fraternity, to prevent the existence and the possibility 
of civil war and internecine struggle, to re-establish
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the existence and the authority of the state, and to
eliminate the factors that hinder the smooth working of
43
the democratic order.
Also, according to him "what lies at the basis of the
Turkish Republic...is the sublime Atatürk's philosophy that says:
'Happy is he who calls himself a Turk'. This philosophy includes
every citizen who considers himself a Turk regardless of creed,
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race or religion". The military junta blamed all the 
political organizations and politicians for their incapacity 
of holding the state and the nation together. The military tried 
hard to promote Kemalism with its moderate nationalism.
Even though the military government was definitely Kemalist,
it did not try to eliminate the idea of the Turkish-Islam 
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synthesis , which had been developed for some time for the 
purpose of using it as a unifying factor in the fragmented 
society. This synthesis, basically formulated by the Aydınlar 
Ocağı (The Hearth of Enlighteneds), was for a nationalism which 
was equally influenced by ethnicity and religion. Being strongly 
reactive to leftist ideas and organizations, they argued that 
the Ottoman state, history and culture were the roots of the 
present-day Turkish polity and society.
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By 1982, new parties emerged, after they were allowed to by 
the military government. But the parties which declared, or even 
gave the impression, that they were the continuum of the pre- 
1980 parties, were not allowed to enter the elections. The 
Motherland Party (MP) came to the scene as a united (right) 
party. Claiming that it was a synthesis of all the major parties 
of the pre-1980 period, it had the support of the Turkish- 
Islamists. Many members of the now defunct NAP, NSP and JP 
voted for the MP, and many of the ex-members of these parties 
became its members.
The referendum of 1987, however, gave back the right of 
active politics to the banned politicians. The successor 
parties to the pre-1980 parties were now opened. In the right 
wing of the political spectrum were there now the Prosperity 
Party (successor of the NSP), Nationalist Work Party 
(successor of the NAP) and True Path Party (successor of the JP) 
and the MP which claimed that it was the synthesis of all the 
pre-1980 political parties .
The discourses of the successor parties were not different 
from their predecessors, but the depolitization policy of the 
military government, and the comfort of living in security, 
discouraged many from taking a partisan stance on conflictual 
issues. Being "democrat" and moderate person was increasingly
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emphasized.
3.3) Ethnic Groups and their Demands
In the Republic of Turkey there are two major ethnic groups:
Turks and Kurds. Kurds are around 10-20 percent of the
population. It is claimed that in 60 years Kurds will be in the 
46
majority. Speaking different dialects and holding different 
religious sectars, the Kurds do not present a homogenous entity,
however, to a large extent, they share the same folkloric
rituals.
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According to Milton Esman and Itamar Rabinovich the
Turkish state structure explicitly incorporates the aspirations 
of the dominant ethnic group. Others are expected to accept a
different relationship to the state than members of the dominant 
group. The former might enjoy explicit and recognized rights, 
they might be encouraged to assimilate as individuals, or they 
might be culturally repressed, economically subordinated, and 
in some cases encouraged to emigrate. Combinations are possible, 
the main point being that the state is regarded as the instrument 
of a single ethnic group; other groups must accomodate
themselves to the terms of coexistence determined by the dominant 
group.
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The last constitution of Turkey was approved by 92 percent 
of the population in a referendum in 1982. Article 26 of the 
Constitution states that no language prohibited by law shall be 
used in the expression and dissemination of thought. Any written 
or printed documents, photograph records, magnetic or 
videotapes, and other media instruments used in contravention of 
this provision will be confiscated. Article 28 declares that 
publications will not be made in any language prohibited by law. 
These two articles were changed by the Motherland Party and the 
opposition. Since then newspapers and magazines have been 
published in Kurdish, as well as tape cassettes folk songs in 
Kurdish.
Article 57 of the Constitution stipulates that all 
political activity must promote "the indivisibility of the 
national homeland" and Article 89 provides, in part, that "no
political party may concern itself with the defense,
development, or diffusion of any non-Turkish language or 
culture; nor may they seek to create minorities within our 
frontiers or to destroy our national unity."
The question of why Turkish state and its leaders needed to
put this kind of clauses in the constitution could only be
answered by the "divisiveness anxiety". According to Şerif
Mardin, there is the tendency of each group to accuse others of
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"evil designs" and "trying to divide the Turkish nation". 
Frederick W. Frey adds that the Turks may have good reason to 
fear divisiveness, not only objective reasons in the form of
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external threats or an extremely heterogeneous society, but 
valid reasons deriving from an awareness of their own 
psychological tendencies toward extremism in commitment and 
contention. But in this approach, the historical experiment of 
the Turks was overlooked. A century ago, Turkish state was an 
empire with huge resources and territories. Step by step, it 
was dismembered and every particular loss of territory created 
deep disappointments and anxiety in Turkish society. These 
feelings and the fear of getting smaller rendered the founders of 
the Republic and their followers cautious and sensitive to the 
issues of national unity.
Today, Kurdish leaders seem forced to seek increasingly 
radical political solutions if they hope to sustain their culture 
and their distinctive identity. Some form of official 
enfranchisement, and some degree of pluralism, is, therefore, 
crucial both to the exercise of their authority from within 
traditional ethnic boundaries and from without, in Turkish 
society. At least one outcome of this unrelenting social reality 
is the intensifying feeling of political alienation in these 
communities. Under such circumstance, social life and ethnic 
boundary maintenance may, indeed, take on an extremist 
dimension.
The Secretary General of PSKT (Socialist Party of Turkish 
Kurdistan), Kemal Burkay demands from the coalition government 
of the SDPP and TPP the lifting of the martial law, the right of
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political activity for all, an unlimited freedom of thought and
organization, the education and broadcasting in Kurdish and the
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usage of Kurdish in governmental affairs. According to him all 
the separatist forces are turned to be for a federal or 
structurally plural state. If the state would end its 
suppressive policy, all political activity directed against peace 
and democracy will lose its significance.
It is clear that Turkish government will continue to resist
strongly to any attempt by the Turkish Kurds to achieve political
autonomy. It not only has a large army and other security forces
in the east, but also is capable of quickly reinforcing them.
In addition, most Kurds oppose the separatists' actions. An
official in Hakkari commented, "The people know that their
future prospects are much more likely to be improved by
attracting industry and expanding agriculture than by helping a
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bunch of insurgents create anarchy".
3.4) Dialectical Summary of Turkish Nationalism
Nationalism in Turkey followed a path which was full of 
curves. Every type of nationalism emerged when the precedent 
could not succeed in forging unity among the citizens. Ottoman 
millet system could not survive because of the ethno-religious 
aspirations in the beginning of the nineteenth century. Pan- 
Islamism alienated the non-Muslims, and Muslims with its way of
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application. Ottomanism, being secular, overlooked the fact 
that historically peoples of the Empire had never known any other 
allegiance than the religious one. Pan-Turkism with its 
irredentism, accelerated the demise of the Empire. Kemalist 
nationalism tended to ignore religion. Center-right nationalism 
is still in practice nearly for fourty years, but it is 
challenged by Islamism, Pan-Turkism and secular nationalism.
Witnessing this phenomena, that is the dismemberment of the 
Empire and simultaneously the changes in nationalism, one is 
forced to raise the question of whether different nationalisms 
helped to dismember the Empire or the dismemberment created 
new versions of nationalism. It is beyond the scope of this 
study even to begin to answer the query.
Very interestingly, however, always one conception of 
nationalism was represented in governmental circles, and with the 
introduction of multi-party politics, almost all of the past 
nationalisms found a niche in political parties. An anti-thesis 
to nationalism never found the opportunity to oppose it in equal 
power.
The question of Turkish national identity is a dialectical 
one. Although they make up only a small percentage of Turkey's 
population, nondominant ethno-religious groups continue to play
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an apparently important role in defining Turkey's self-identity 
and its self-conscious stance.
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Chapter Four
TRUE PATH PARTY AND NATIONALISM
4.1) Development of the True Path Party
Following the 1980 military intervention Suleyman Demirel
was sent to Hamzakoy, a military camp. Even before his return
to Ankara, he tried to keep in touch with all levels of the
party organization, for avoiding the threat of disunity which
had occurred in 1971. During this early period he did not
utter any word against the military and its government, and he
even sent the summaries of the interviews made with foreign 
1
press, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs claiming that the 
state belongs to all.
On October 16, 1981, military government closed all the
political parties including, of course, the JP. This made
bitter the relationship between Demirel and the military
government, but the real polarization occurred when the draft
constitution that was to be presented to the people in
November 7, 1982 took its final shape. All pre-1980 active
politicians were banned from politics. Although center-right was
2
experienced in finding loopholes for restrictions of this kind, 
staying away 10 years from active politics was unacceptable for 
the JP leadership. The 92 percent approval of the Constitution
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was another disappointment. Whatever the conditions were, 
Demirel continued to keep in touch with all levels of the JP 
organization.
In fact the JP waited only for a signal from its leader:
Soon Great Turkey Party, with its name being a slogan of JP,
was founded . Led by a retired General, Fethi Esener, this
party was a definite successor to the JP. As a result, it was
closed down by the military government, despite General Esener,
and the top leaders of the JP and RPP were sent to Zincirbozan,
a military camp again. On the road, Demirel decided to
3
establish the TPP.
Although it satisfied all the legal provisions, the TPP was 
not allowed to compete in the elections of 1983. Its voters
mostly voted for the Motherland Party (MP), which was headed by 
Turgut Ozal, one of the Demirel's favorite bureaucrats. Ozal
claimed that his party represented a synthesis of the four 
major pre-1980 parties. The MP won the 1983 elections .
In the absence of Demirel, the TPP was headed by Hüsamettin 
Cindoruk and became a strong out of parliament opposition. The 
self-abolishment of the Nationalist Democracy Party in 1984, 
which was the favorite of the junta, created the opportunity for 
the TPP to organize a parliament group. With the pressure of 
this and the SDPP parliamentary group a referendum was held in
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1987 on the question of the political restrictions on former 
politicians. With a very small margin, the voters gave the 
political rights back, and the MP called early elections before 
the results of the referendum were obtained.
The 1987 elections increased the MP majority in the 
parliament; and the TPP won 59 seats. Although the main 
opposition party was the SDPP, because of the competition on the 
center-right votes, the TPP resorted to aggresive opposition.
The early elections of 21 October 1991, made a coalition 
obligatory, since no party could obtain the majority. A 
coalition could not be formed without the TPP. Even though the 
center-rightists seemed to wish a TPP-MP coalition, the TPP had 
decided to make a coalition with SDPP.
4.2) The Nationalism of Nationalism of the True Path Party
4.2.1) Conjunctural Changes: Potential Factors on True Path
Party's Nationalism
The second decade of the twentieth century was a turning 
point in human history. Ideologies, borders, cultures and 
societies found themselves in an irresistible process of change. 
The same was true for the second decade preceding the century's 
end, 1980-90. The destruction of the Iron Wall had a deep 
impact on ideologies, borders, cultures and societies. The
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change was not only the disarrangement of the bipolar equilibrium
of the super powers of USSR and USA, but the whole world system.
The self-abolishment of Warsaw Pact let loose all members of
4
the communist block; "Frank Sinatra doctrine" permitted every 
one to do it its way. Quickly ethnic problems came to the 
agenda. The reunification of the two Germanies and the 
disunification of the Soviet Union increased ethnic conflicts. 
Yugoslavian and Czechoslovakian experiments were of the same 
origin. Ethnicity came to the agenda of the world which was now 
led by democratic capitalist powers. Being democratic, these 
powers encouraged the minority and ethnic rights. The New
World Order is for the liberal democratic state; any anti­
democratic suppression, any illegal use of force would be tried 
being stopped by the international community.
Another important result of the destruction of the Iron Wall 
was the emergence of the new Turkic republics in the former 
Soviet Union. Sharing an ethnic culture with Turks, Kazaks, 
Ozbeks, Azeris, Turkmans, Tatars, Abhazas and to some extent 
Tajiks are now living as independent entities. Their need for 
modernization created an interest in these countries towards 
Turkey which, even though not yet fully succeeded, had made 
considerable progress on the road to modernization. These states 
see Turkey as a secular-democrat-1iberal-model from which they 
can take lessons, but their main interest is in Turkey's liberal 
economy.
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Although it all began with 24 January 1980 decisions of
Demirel government, liberal economic policies reached their peak
during the early part of the period of MP governments. Turkish
economic system turned from import substitution to export-
promotion policies. With export promoting strategies, in ten
years (1980-1990) exports increased by 1000 percent, car
5
production by 600 percent, and tourism revenues by 900 percent. 
In all sectors production increased 2-3 times, with the 
exception of agriculture. Parallel with the economic growth, 
Turks increasingly became "homo economicus". The materialist 
values, perhaps for the first time in Turkish history, found 
support in society.
This economic growth and the depolitization policies of 
the junta as well as the bitter memories of the pre-1980s
created a new political culture. Aggression and aggressive 
political activities lost their value; stubbornness and
uncompromising attitudes left their place to dialogue and 
reconciliation.
All these changes affected Turkish nationalism. The 
Democratic Left Party (DLP), founded by the ex-leader of the 
RPP, Buient Ecevit, was blamed for being fascistic when it 
claimed that the Turkic republics are in the interest area of 
Turkey. The Nationalist Work Party (NWP) founded by Alparslan 
Turkey as a successor to the NAP, never even mentioned the
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unification of Turkey and Turkic republics. Although his party 
was for a. Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the MP leader Turgut Ozal 
argued that a federative solution to the South East Anatolia 
problem should be discussed. All the concepts and principles 
which shaped the political parties' definitions of nationalism 
in pre-1980 period now had their anti-theses. The one and the 
only "consistent" party is the Prosperity Party (PP) which sees 
Islam as the basis of national identity, not unlike its 
predecessor the NSP.
Also among the intelligentsia are there brand new themes, 
and the taboos of the pre-1980 period are shattered. "New- 
Ottomans" are for an active foreign policy toward the political 
entities in the former Ottoman territories. They visualize an 
empire - in this age perhaps a federation - of which the capital 
is Istanbul. "Second Republicanists" are for a more democratic- 
liberal state, claiming that the Turkish state should be 
minimalized; and emphasis should be placed on the individual. 
They see the RPP, which will be re-opened as the pioneer of this 
change.
4.2.2) The True Path Party and Ethnic Nationalism
The oath-taking ceremony of the new members of the 
Parliament took place on November 7, 1991. When Hatip Dicle 
came to take his oath, he said that he and his friends were
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doing this under the pressure of the Constitution. Then Leyla 
Zana carried a handkerchief in the colors of the flag of the 
Kurdish separatists, and after her oath she spoke in Kurdish. 
Both of the parliament members were of Kurdish origin, and ex­
members of the People's Work Party which entered the elections 
on SDPP's lists. The event created a strong reaction among MP, 
Nationalist Work Party and TPP parliament members. The TPP 
members found in themselves the courage of trying physically to 
stop their Kurdish fellows. The Assistant Speaker of the 
Parliament and a TPP member of Kurdish origin, Ali Riza Septiogiu 
who was presiding the session, invited the activitists to act 
within the Constitution and retake their oaths "properly". MP 
and TPP members were not satisfied and insisted that these two 
members should apologize. Demirel, commenting on the incident, 
said that it was an expected publicity campaign as well as a
provocation and indicated that the reaction of the Parliament was
6
not racial or ethnic, but constitutional.
According to the Speaker of the House who was elected on the
TPP ticket, Hiisamettin Cindoruk, TPP's nationalism cannot be
questioned, but it is not a racial but cultural nationalism;
7
it may also be called republican nationalism. Demirel,
parallel to Cindoruk, said that people in Turkey have different
ethnic origins; almost an Ottoman mosaic exists in Turkey; the
8
Republic became a cement in uniting these people. Ayvaz
Gokdemir, in his serial in Terciiman, claimed that in Turkey
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there were ethnic groups but a Turkish nation, and every single
individual who was a Turkish citizen has been accepted as a 
9
Turk, and Ataturk's nationalism was a cultural one aiming at
raising the national culture to a higher level than contemporary 
10
civilization.
On the other hand, one of the candidates for the Minister of
11
Foreign Affairs from the TPP, Coşkun Kırca , pointed out that
the history shows that it is not necessary for every ethnic
group to become a nation and a state, and that different ethnic
groups could live within a state, a super-culture. According to
him, the Kurdish culture is a sub-culture which did not produce
1 2
any significant cultural product in arts like architecture.
He asserted that although the Ottoman Empire was not a national
state, in that Empire the dominant group was made up of Turks or
Turkified individuals. In a parallel manner, Ayvaz Gökdemir
argued that Turks set up Turkish Republic and became its 
13
protectors. Süleyman Demire!, too, said that the Turkish
state was established by the people of Turkish descent but the
14
others are not second class citizens.
In the TPP, there are, therefore, some members who 
support ethnic Turkish nationalism. They deny the significance 
of any other ethnic group rather than the Turks inside of Turkish 
borders. They are known as the hawks of the TPP. Inheriting 
the JP's conception of nationalism, they are unwillingly granting 
legitimacy to any ethnic group which might destabilize Turkey.
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They adopt the nationalist politics of the monoparty period that 
were inflexible and which were based on the presumed dominance of 
the Turkish element, but their ethnic nationalism is 
instrumentalist rather than primordialist, these two types of 
ethnic nationalism were discussed in Chapter One.
Another group inside the TPP is not for an ethnic Turkish 
national ism:
---Turkish nationalism is a moderate nationalism which is
not based on race and which does not reject other ethnic
groups in Turkey. The nationalism in question is not
chauvinistic, not racist; it only serves Turkey's 
15
unity.
This group realize the significance of the South Eastern
Problem while the world is furthering democracy. They,
therefore, do not subscribe to ethnic nationalism. According
to them recognizing the Kurdish reality would not fragment
Turkey since the Turks and Kurds share the same history.
Together, they experienced both pride and shame. They built
21
this country together by giving their blood. Demirel pointed
out that, now, it was impossible to oppose the individual who
speaks Kurdish and belittle his Kurdish origin; because of this
17
the government recognized the Kurdish reality. Bedrettin
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Dal an in line with Demirel, blamed the MP party to fament
chauvinism in Turkey. He especially opposed Turgut Ozal, who
once said that he had Kurdish origins too, claiming that MP and
its economic and security policies brought about the South 
19
Eastern Problem.
18
Even though, there are differences among the party members 
concerning nationalism, they are for the same foreign policy 
toward the outer Turks. In a television forum made on December 
30, 1991, Demirel referred to the emergence of the new Turkic 
republics as a very important development. He said that a new 
Turkish world has been created from the Adriatic to the Chinese 
Sea, and this new world offered both opportunities and 
responsibilities for Turkey.
According to the TPP, close relations with the newly 
emerged Turkic communities, and Turkey's guidance to these 
communities on the road to modernization are the accurate 
policies. A cultural unification with these communities will 
help Turkey at the international arena, too. But a federation 
or any other geographical or political unification is out of 
question.
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4.2.3) The True Path Party and Territorial Nationalism
One phrase of the 1982 constitution summarizes the 
territorial dimension of TPP's nationalism, "the indivisible 
unity of the state with its country and its nation." The TPP 
earnestly emphasizes this indivisibility.
The TPP's by-laws define the unity of the country and its
20
security as the basic principles of its nationalism. Among the
aims of the Party are the preservation of the national and
geographical unity of the state, and the protection of the
Republic against all kinds of destructive, separatist and
21
divisionist acts and movements. To be a member of the Party
one should believe by heart in the singularity and the unity of 
22
the Republic.
The party leadership's view is consistent with the above
statements. In their election manifesto of 1991, it is stated
that, the TPP does not recognize any value more dominant or more
23
precious than the national and territorial unity of Turkey. It
is also stated that the indivisible unity of the country is the
sine qua non basis of Turkish national and international 
24
politics. According to ísmet Sezgin (Minister of Internal
Affairs), it is a citizenship duty and responsibility to oppose
any attempt against national unity for which much blood was 
25
sacrificed.
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The near xenophobic feelings of the TPP's leadership toward
any threat to territorial unity is observable in their speeches,
too. Sezgin said that throughout the history, because of its
geopolitical importance, countries which had interests on
the region, and the neighbours who had felt anxiety of a
developed Turkey, made attempts to weaken Turkey, and they
26
continue to do so. Cindoruk, going one step further,
described those countries which support the separatist terror as 
27
aggressors. Demirel blamed some western countries to be the
supporters of the ethnic separatist terror and to threaten the 
28
world peace.
Pointing to the indestructibility of the Misak-i Mi 11i
borders being the core of the territorial dimension of the TPP
nationalism, Gokdemir argued that blood, faith and culture
turns a land into a country. He added that after 1080, the
territories of present-day Turkey are recorded in history as 
29
"Turcia." Turkish nation converted this geography into a
Turkish and Muslim land, by their works of arts and the roads 
30
they built. Cindoruk argued that the shared aim of the
citizens of Turkish Republic, should be that of defending the
country. He mentioned that he would not even listen to
31
discussions on the division of the Republic of Turkey.
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One can conclude that, the territorial dimension of TPP's 
nationalism is its core. The indivisibility of vatan is more 
important than the national unity based on cultural background. 
Cultural nationalism, but not ethnic nationalism, is only a 
means to maintain the indivisibility of the territory.
This territorial rather than ethnic character of the TPP's
nationalism changes totally when the subject matter is the outer
Turks. The hawks are for a more active foreign policy concerning
32
the Turkic republics and that the leader of the TPP talks 
about a new Turkish world from Adriatic to the Chinese Sea. 
Here, however, cultural nationalism, but still not ethnic 
nationalism, shapes party's dominant approach. Geographical unity 
of Turkic states in the form of a federation is never mentioned 
by the TPP leadership.
4.2.4) The True Path Party and the South Eastern Problem
During the period it was in opposition, the TPP blamed the 
MP government of bringing the country to a point of disunity. 
According to the TPP the socieconomic policies of the MP and its 
handling of the South Eastern Problem by using force, decreased 
the loyalty of the people living in the region to the state. 
They shifted their sympathy, if not their support, from the 
state to the separatist forces.
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In their manifesto for the 1991 elections, TPP leaders
stated that the MP government, with heedlessness, put the
country in a search for national identity, and caused political
33
and social fluctuations in the country. Also, Dalan who once
was a MP mayor, blamed the MP government for bringing the
country to the edge of a civil war with wrong economic
policies, and for oppressing the South Eastern people. He added
34
that the state and nation came to oppose each other.
According to Sezgin, the citizens living in the region were
looking for their state. They were expecting to have a decent
living standard, love and respect, and humanistic approaches
35
to their problems. He also argued that these citizens were for
36
social peace and social consensus.
The solution package of the government led by the TPP for 
the problem emphasized regional economic development and 
pluralist democracy. Regional economic development policies, 
including social ones, will lead to a rise in the living 
standards of the people. Pluralist democracy will eliminate the 
second class citizenship feelings on the part of these people. 
There is a necessity to distiguish the people from the 
separatist forces; to the latter government could not act even in 
a moderate manner.
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Regional development policies of the TPP were described in
37
detail in the election manifesto of the party. It is stated 
that for the TPP the development of the South Eastern Anatolia is 
not only an economic problem, but a basic mission that should 
succeed for the sake of the integrity of the country. It is 
necessary to put an end to poverty in the region; this can be 
done only by productive direct investment by the state.
The pluralist democracy, on the other hand, is a more
difficult goal to attain, compared to economic development,
because the TPP fiercely opposes all kinds of political activity
against the integrity of the country, even if this activity is 
38 39
not violent. Also the party is against federative solutions.
Although the TPP strongly opposes federalism or
confederal ism, it recognizes the necessity for more
democratization. The 1982 Constitution which, banned almost all
of the top leaders of the TPP from active politics and tried to
create a "depoliticized" political system, gave birth to the
famous slogan of the TPP, "speaking Turkey". The open regime in
which everyone could speak is one of the goals of the TPP.
Pluralist democracy policies emerge on these points. Sezgin
described their aim for coming to the government as that of
creating a fair, honest, contemporary, transparent and 
40
democratic state.
94
The major change in the TPP's approach to the South East 
Problem when it came to government was the recognition of "the 
Kurdish reality". In Demirel's words:
There is no such thing as we and you, there is just us.
The Kurdish identity refers to the people who speak
Kurdish, who say "I am of Kurdish origin." Recognizing the
Kurdish reality will not jeopardize the protection of 
41
Turkey's unity.
For the TPP the main problem in the region is the second 
class citizen feeling on the part of the people. Such a feeling 
alienates the people from the state. Demirel often says that 
everyone is a first class citizen of Turkey.
The TPP's attitude toward the separatist terror
organizations is clear: the gun-firing man should be stopped at
42
all costs according to Demirel. But while doing this, the TPP 
government differentiates the innocent people from the
terrorists. The struggle against the terrorists will stay within 
the limits of law. And the innocent people of the region will 
be "sure that it is the milkman [and not a terrorist] who is 
knocking on his door in the early morning."
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1. Yalçın Doğan, Dar Sokakta Siyaset (1980-1983) (İstanbul,
Tekin Yayınevi, 1985) pp. 124-8.
2. When the Democratic Party leaders and parlementerians were 
arrested after the 1960 military intervention, Ragıp Gümüşpala, 
a retired general became the leader of the JP, functioning
as a shield against the military.
3. See Doğan, "Dar Sokakta Siyaset", pp. 343-5.
4. The spokesman of the Soviet politbureau described this
doctrine as follows: "I did it my way."
5. Ahmet Özden and Hakan Tunç, "Türkiye Ortadoğu'nun
Japonyası", Aktüel, ( January 2-8 1992), p. 24.
6. The TPP parliament members Ertekin Durutürk and Ethem
Kelekçi reached the oath-taking pulpit, took the
handkerchief of Hatip Dicle, showed it to the assembly 
claiming that it was the flag of the separatists. With the 
addition of some other members, two groups pushed one 
another. Dicle and Zana retook their oaths but they did 
not apologize from the parliament. Tercüman (Istanbul daily), 
November 7-8-9, 1991.
7. Tercüman, November 3, 1991, p. 12.
8. Cumhuriyet (Istanbul daily), August 9, 1992, p. 16.
9. Ayvaz Gökdemir, "Milli Kimlik Meseleleri", Tercüman,
July 23, 1991, p. 10. Gökdemir is a TPP parliament member and 
he is famous for his initiatives that opposed SDPP's leftist
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political aims; he is the leader of the conservatives within the TPP.
10. Gökdemir, "Milli Kimlik Meseleleri", p. 10.
11. Coşkun Kırca is a retired ambassador and writer for Milliyet, 
(Istanbul daily). Many predicted that he would be the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. He is now a prominent member of the 
conservative opposition within the party.
12. Coşkun Kırca, Milliyet, August 3, 1992, p. 10.
13. Gökdemir, "Milli Kimlik Meseleleri", p. 10.
14. Tercüman, December 9, 1991, p. 11.
15. Süleyman Demirel, Tercüman, December 9, 1991, p. 11.
16. İsmet Sezgin (the Minister of Internal Affairs), Tercüman,
December 13, 1991, p. 11.
17. Tercüman, December 9, 1991, p. 11.
18. Former mayor from the MP of İstanbul Metropolitan 
Municipality of MP, and the former leader of the Democratic 
Center Party, which later joined the TPP.
19. Tercüman, September 22, 1991, p. 12.
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21. Ibid., Article 2, p. 10.
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23. Doğru Yol Partisi Seçim Bildirgesi, Ankara, 1992,
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25. Tercüman, December 13, 1991, p. 1 1 .
26. Tercüman, December 25, 1991, p. 9.
27. Tercüman, November 3, 1991, p. 12.
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31. Tercüman, November 3, 1991, p. 12.
32. See Coşkun Kırca's views in Aktüel, 13 (3-9 October 1991),
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34. Tercüman, September 22, 1991, p. 12.
35. Tercüman, December 14, 1991, p. 9.
36. Tercüman, December 13, 1991, p. 11.
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38. Ibid. , p. 12.
39. Hasan Cemal, Sabah (Istanbul daily), April 9, 1992, 
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41. Tercüman, December 9, 1991, p. 11.
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Chapter Five 
CONCLUSION
Like in all other developing countries, political elite in 
Turkey shape the political discourse and the policies necessary 
to attain the political objectives. They also shape the 
society. As a matter of fact, the society is in a situation of 
being a passive receiver of policies. In Turkey the rights are 
granted from above and not obtained by those below.
The elite's conception of nationalism is thus crucial. 
Disappointed by the dismemberment of the empire that they ruled, 
the elite's conception of nationalism is influenced by a 
divisiveness anxiety that includes a feeling of xenophobia. To 
avoid the threats of division, the elite use nationalism to unify 
the people living in the country.
There is an overemphasis on cultural unity. The elite often 
oppress the opposing groups in society; although they use force 
only against violent opposition. Consequently people are 
alienated from the elite. With the multi-party politics, 
however, the elite realized that they should convince the masses 
rather than impose their policies.
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These generalizations are valid for the TPP political elite, 
as well. They, too, use nationalism as an element of unity. They 
think that the territory, the nation, and the state had been in a 
process of disintegration, and that there is a need for a 
pluralist democracy to stop this deterioration. They recognized 
the Kurdish reality as a solution for the South East Problem and 
launched regional economic development projects. The TPP 
political elite do not look at the matter of outer Turks with an 
expansionist view. There is, however, an effort to foster 
cultural ties with them.
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